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Abstract 
The permanence of land management practices adopted under Agri-environmental schemes 
(AES) is often questioned. This paper investigates the drivers of farmers’ decision as to 
whether to maintain “pro-environment” practices beyond the duration of a contract, and in 
particular the effect of social norms. Our results, based on the stated intentions of 395 French 
farmers, show that both pecuniary and non-pecuniary motivations drive farmers’ decision, 
which is also significantly influenced by information about a social norm. Therefore 
“nudging” farmers, by conveying information to them on other farmers’ pro-environmental 
practices, appears as a means of maintaining the long-run benefits of AES.  
Keywords Agri-environmental schemes; Permanence; End of Contract problem; Framing 
effects; Social norms. 
JEL code Q18; Q28 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Agri-environmental schemes (AES) have been used in the European Union (EU), USA and 
Australia to address a wide range of environmental issues, from the conservation of 
biodiversity to water quality enhancement and landscape protection. These schemes are based 
on individual contracts signed with farmers who volunteer to implement pro-environmental 
management practices in return for an annual payment. This payment is calculated so as to 
compensate average compliance costs and foregone farming revenue due to the adoption of 
new management practices. Budgets dedicated to AES are significant and are therefore under 
public scrutiny. Over the 2007-2013 financial period, total payments made by the European 
Union for agri-environmental schemes (AES)
1
 amounted to 22.7 billion euros, with an approximately-equivalent amount of additional 
spending by Member states.   
All AES contracts have an end point, with contracts lasting from 5 years in French 
“territorialised agri-environmental measures”, to 10 years in the UK Higher Level 
Stewardship scheme, 15 years for some of the contracts of the US Conservation Reserve 
Program, and 20 years in the now-defunct Environmentally Sensitive Areas scheme in the 
UK. At the end of the contract, farmers are free of any contracted commitment concerning 
their land management choices, and can therefore revert to environmentally-damaging 
practices even if this destroys the accumulated natural capital resulting from participation 
(Hanley et al. 1999). This issue has been referred to as the “end of the contract problem” 
(Whitby 2000), and is an important criticism to be made of AES and more generally of 
Payments for Environmental Services (PES) schemes (Swart 2003), especially when budget 
constraints are tight and under public scrutiny. Policy makers’ interest in investing in AES 
would increase if the land management practices induced by the contract were permanently 
adopted. This end-of-contract problem is particularly problematic when new practices are less 
profitable than less environmentally-beneficial alternatives.  
However, motivations other than profit can also be expected to influence farmers’ choice to 
contribute to the provision of environmental services, even without monetary compensation. 
Indeed a growing literature demonstrates that information about one’s own behaviour relative 
to that of others (an indicator of a ‘social norm’) can influence individual behaviours (Croson 
and Treich 2014).  Thaler and Sunstein (2008) show that individual choices are shaped not 
only by information about what others in the same social group do, but also by the way this 
information is formulated and provided, the so-called “framing” of information. They 
introduce the concept of “nudge” as the use of a specific policy design, type of information 
and framing of information which influences people’s decisions without changing the 
structure of economic incentives or restricting their available options. We use information on 
a social norm – specifically the behaviour of others in a reference group – as a behavioural 
nudge, and investigate its effects on stated intentions. We also investigate the impacts of 
changing the framing of this information on the social norm. 
A first objective of this work is therefore to investigate the drivers of farmers’ land 
management intentions at the end of AES contracts. Will farmers keep providing enhanced 
environmental services even in the absence of any payment; or does a short term contract 
necessarily lead to a short term provision of conservation benefits? This paper will review 
existing studies on this question and will focus more specifically on behavioural drivers which 
may induce a continuation of pro-environmental actions after the end of the contract, even 
when the new practices are less profitable to the farmer.  The main focus of this paper is to 
investigate the effect of: (i) providing information about what other farmers do or intend to 
do, i.e. giving them an indication of what the prevailing “social norm” might be, in terms of 
farmers’ willingness to maintain the land management practices they adopted under the AES 
after the contract ends, and (ii) whether the framing of this information about the behaviour of 
others matters to individual’s stated intention. 
The behavioural motives underlying the decision to maintain pro-environmental practices 
beyond the duration of the contract and the effect of these nudges are tested through a national 
survey conducted in France in 2013. We sampled 395 French farmers engaged in agri-
environmental contracts. Our results show that information about what other farmers intend to 
do can greatly influence a farmer’s stated decision whether to maintain or not the practices 
they adopted during the AES after the contract ends in the absence of payments. However, 
changes in the framing of this information have no significant effect on their stated intentions. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. We provide first a literature review on the 
permanence of agri-environmental practices in section 2, and evidence of the role of social 
norms and framing in individual pro-environmental behaviour in section 3. We then describe 
in a fourth section the method and data used. Finally we present and discuss the estimated 
effect of social norm information and its framing on farmers’ stated intentions to continue 
with environmentally-friendly land management practices even in the absence of an agri-
environmental contract.  
II. PERMANENCE OF AGRI-ENVIRONMENTAL PRACTICES AFTER THE END OF 
THE AGRI-ENVIRONMENTAL  CONTRACT 
Farmers engaging in AES can provide environmental services in two ways: through land 
retirement or by modifying their resource use or farming practices, that is, by “land sparing” 
or “land sharing” (Lipper et al. 2009 ; Balmford 2012). Land sparing options, such as wetland 
or grassland creation on farmland, require setting the farm plot aside from production. Such 
options usually create significant and long-lasting opportunity costs for participants in terms 
of the net value of production foregone. Other options, pertaining more to the “land sharing” 
approach, offer payments to farmers who agree to reduce the intensity of agricultural 
production, such as a limitation in stocking rates or a reduction of chemical pesticide or 
fertilizer use. Typically, these changes also come at a cost in terms of profits foregone 
(Armsworth et al., 2012) since they usually induce lower and more variable yields or may 
require higher management costs. Assuming that farmers make their decisions based on 
relative profits from alternative land management options, it is logical to expect that farmers 
will not maintain more costly practices without compensatory payments. This can be 
reinforced by a tendency to refuse to provide for free an environmental service for which they 
were paid during the contract period. As Engel et al. (2008) argue, “there cannot be any 
expectation of permanence in the absence of payments” as the logic of AES (as well as 
Payments for Environmental Services) turns public good supply into a marketable service.  
However, some studies show that land management changes induced by AES become 
permanent.  Roberts and Lubowski (2007) show that more than 40% of farmlands engaged in 
the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) would not have been returned to crops if the 
program had ended in 1997. Although this striking conclusion might be due to the context of 
their analysis (especially in terms of crop prices), it points to the fact that some newly adopted 
practices might be maintained by farmers even without monetary compensation. Other 
evaluations (ECA 2011) also find that there is only a partial reversal to previous management 
practices at the end of contracts.  
There are several possible explanations for this observation. The first one is that farmers 
enrolling into agri-environmental schemes would have changed their practices even without 
any financial incentives for enrolment. In such case, AES contracts have provided windfall 
gains to farmers without environmental additionality (Chabé-Ferret and Subervie 2013). 
Therefore, farmers have no reason to change their practices after the end of the contract. But 
new practices can also be adopted permanently under AESs that have induced a true change. 
Since landowners base their choices on their beliefs about the relative pay-offs of alternative 
land management options they face, enrolling into an agri-environmental contract offers them 
with the opportunity to test the true costs and constraints associated with the adoption of new 
practices. For example, in the case of land sharing options, the transition towards pro-
environment practices may require short term additional costs, such as investments in 
mechanical weeding equipment to replace chemical weeding, but may reveal itself less costly 
in the longer run than conventional farming methods. The AES payment supports farmers 
during this investment period, along with opportunities for them to acquire new skills and 
better knowledge of the risks. Assuming that these risks can be reduced with time and 
experience, and that the new practices are privately profitable after the fixed starting costs are 
overcome, the switch to low-input practices can become permanent with no additional 
incentive. The payments provided by agri-environmental schemes represent thus an 
opportunity to learn more about such pay-offs and to change initial  beliefs, to break away 
from existing production “habits” and form new habits, potentially motivating the supply of 
environmental services even in the absence of AES payments (Hiedanpää and Bromley 2014).  
Beyond financial motives, there are other drivers of changes. Motivations can also be non-
pecuniary but selfish (this is the case when a participant is motivated by gaining a  better 
reputation, a warm glow feeling or enjoying social acknowledgment that he contributes to the 
public good) or purely altruistic, when the participant genuinely seeks to contribute to the 
improvement of the public good (Glaeser 2014). As we will discuss in the next section, social 
norms can “super-charge” these non-pecuniary motivations and thus increase the likelihood 
that farmers maintain pro-environmental practices despite the end of the financial incentives.  
III. SOCIAL NORMS, FRAMING AND PRO-ENVIRONMENTAL BEHAVIOUR 
Farmers’ decisions whether to maintain pro-environmental practices after the end of an AES 
contract can be considered as a public good supply problem. Farmers who decide to maintain 
pro-environmental practices may bear private costs whereas environmental improvements will 
benefit all members of the community. A large amount of research effort has been focused on 
understanding why people contribute to public goods, when the main game theoretic 
prediction would be not to contribute. One interpretation is that a large proportion of people 
are conditional co-operators: people tend to contribute more when other people contribute too. 
In a seminal article, Fischbacher et al. (2001) demonstrate, using the strategy method
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public good games where players choose their contribution depending on others’ 
contributions, that about 50% of people are conditional co-operators. In other experiments, 
subjects are even willing to pay to get information about others’ contribution in a public good 
game in order to decide on their voluntary contribution (Kurzban and DeScioli 2008). 
These experimental results have been confirmed in the field. Frey and Meier (2004) carried 
out an experiment at the University of Zurich where students were all asked to contribute to a 
charity fund but were given different information on other students’ contribution rates. This 
information had a significant effect: more students contributed when they had the information 
that 64 percent of the other students contributed than when they had the information that only 
46 percent contributed. The choice to contribute or not was also significantly correlated with 
students’ expectations of others’ behaviour. This approach has also been used to analyse the 
phenomenon of tax evasion. Paying taxes can be considered irrational if the probability of 
detection and the penalty if caught are analysed. Tax evasion should therefore normally be 
much higher than what it is in most countries. Tax payers seem to be largely influenced in 
their tax morale by the perception that they have of the behaviour of others and can therefore 
also be considered as conditional co-operators (Frey and Torgler 2007). There are a number of 
interpretations to explain conditional cooperation: people may value conforming to a social 
norm, have some preference for fairness such as reciprocity, or could consider that 
contributions of others are an indicator of the quality/importance of the public good (Frey and 
Meier 2004).  
Social norms are traditionally considered to be divided into two categories: descriptive norms 
and injunctive norms (Cialdini et al. 1990). A descriptive norm describes behaviour which is 
in some sense “typical” within a group. People tend to comply with descriptive norms because 
they reveal useful information about appropriate behaviour in particular situations: “if others 
do that it must be a good thing to do”. An injunctive norm refers to what constitutes morally 
approved and dis-approved conduct, that is to say what ought to be done. Adherence to 
injunctive norms is linked to other people’s ability to administer social punishment or rewards 
(Thøgersen, 2006). Bicchieri (2006) considers that people are influenced by their subjective 
beliefs about what the others do and think, rather than by the actual behaviour and opinions of 
others. These beliefs may change when new information is received. Providing social 
information about others’ behaviour may therefore modify subjective estimation of norms and 
thus have a positive impact on the adoption of pro-social behaviour.  
In the context of a Payment for Environmental Services scheme subsidising farmers for 
reforestation in China, Chen et al. (2009) show, through a choice experiment survey, that 
individual intentions to re-enrol can be positively influenced by the information that 
neighbours also intend to re-enrol. Farmers also stated that they would require lower subsidies 
to carry out environment protection activities if a large proportion of farmers re-enrolled than 
if few farmers would do so (Chen et al. 2009). In a rather different context, Czajkowski et al. 
(2015) find that adherence to a social norm co-determines the desire to engage in higher levels 
of home recycling for a large group of their sample of Polish households. The positive effect 
of social information on pro-social behaviour has also been demonstrated in other contexts 
mainly in the social psychology literature: dictator games in the laboratory (Bicchieri and 
Xiao 2009), charity giving (Croson et al. 2009), littering (Cialdini et al. 1990), energy 
consumption (Schultz et al. 2007) and student alcohol consumption (Neighbors et al. 2004). 
However, many examples from the literature also show that the framing of information can 
significantly influence individual choices. Framing effects have been studied in psychology, 
in medical and clinical decision making, consumers’ choices and bargaining behaviours 
(Levin et al. 1998). Framing can be defined as “presenting individuals with logically 
equivalent options in semantically different ways” (Krichnamurthy et al. 2001, p.383). One 
particular type of framing is of interest when a social norm is being presented to respondents, 
namely attribute framing (Levin et al. 1998). Attribute framing is a case of valence framing 
where one of the attributes of the choice is presented either positively or negatively. It is 
usually found that a positive attribute framing triggers a positive reaction. For example, 
experiments (Levin et al. 1988) show that respondents are more likely to wish for surgery if 
they are told that the technique used has a 50 percent success rate than if they are told that it 
has a 50 percent failure rate. The authors explain this effect by the way information is 
processed: positive framing creates positive associations in memory which lead to a more 
favourable judgment of the event/object. In order to test this framing effect on farmers’ 
intentions, but also to avoid weakening the social norm effect of information, we tested the 
effect of a negative and a positive framing of information.  
IV. METHOD AND DATA 
The survey was targeted at farmers eligible for the main French agri-environmental scheme 
called Mesures Agro-Environnementales territorialisées, or MAEt. The MAEt scheme was 
introduced in France under the second pillar of the Common Agricultural Policy for the 2007-
2013 period, to target agri-environmental efforts on environmentally vulnerable areas, i.e. the 
most sensitive areas for biodiversity conservation and water quality issues. Concerning water 
quality, the scheme is open to farmers located in the most contaminated drinking water 
catchment areas and/or in priority watersheds, where the risk of failing to achieve Good 
Ecological Status for water bodies set by the European Water Framework Directive is the 
highest. Concerning biodiversity, the scheme is intended to attain the conservation objectives 
of the Natura 2000 network sites, defined by the European Union’s Habitat and Birds 
Directives. The MAEt scheme provides payments both for a change in farmers’ practices or to 
maintain farming practices or activities that benefit the environment but are at risk of 
disappearing. In this scheme, farmers can adopt a wide range of land management options 
such as the reduction of input use (pesticides or fertilizers), the conversion of croplands to 
grasslands or the restoration of hedgerows. They get a compensation payment which is 
calculated so as to cover the average additional costs or/and income foregone associated with 
the chosen land management options.  
Survey and treatments 
We used an online survey
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 to question farmers participating in the MAEt scheme about their 
land management intentions after the end of their contract. This survey was initially set up to 
evaluate the MAEt scheme over the 2007-2013 CAP programming period. One section of the 
questionnaire focusses on land use and land management changes that farmers made when 
joining the MAEt scheme and on their intention to maintain these changes after the end of the 
contract, in the event that it is not renewed by the government. In order to test the effect of the 
social norm and framing effects, we constructed 3 treatment groups within which the question 
on whether farmers intended to maintain their land management practices was put differently 
(Table 1): 
[Table 1] 
The software randomly selected respondents and affected them to one of the three treatments. 
Respondents from groups 1 and 2 were both given the same information, which states the 
results obtained from a pilot survey
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 that was implemented in the Languedoc-Roussillon 
region before the implementation of the national survey. However the framing of the 
information differed: it was positively framed for respondents from group 1 and negatively 
framed for respondents from group 2. 
Considering the literature on conditional cooperation and on social norms, we expect that the 
information on rates of continuation of pro-environmental practices provided to groups 1 and 
2 will have a positive impact on farmers' intentions to also continue with their newly adopted 
practices after their contract ends. However, considering the framing literature, we expect that 
the magnitude of this positive impact will differ depending on whether this information is put 
in a positive or negative framing. In our case, the impact of this information should be higher 
when highlighting the rate of farmers willing to continue, as in treatment 1, than when 
highlighting the rate of farmers NOT willing to continue, as in treatment 2.  
Econometric specification 
As the respondents were randomly assigned to the 3 groups, the treatment effects of 
information on the social norm and the framing of this information are causal, and can 
directly be identified. In order to distinguish the two effects, we proceed in two steps. First, 
we introduce the dummy variable T, which takes the value 1 if the respondent received 
information on the social norm (group 1 and 2), and 0 otherwise (control group). The effect of 
information on the probability that farmers decide to continue pro-environmental land 
management after the end of the contract (y = 1) is obtained through a maximum likelihood 
estimation of the α parameter in:  
 𝑃(𝑦 = 1) = 𝐹(𝛼𝑇) (1) 
where F(.) is the cumulative distribution function of the logistic distribution. 
Next, we distinguish two framing effects: T1 and T2. T1 is a dummy variable that takes the 
value 1 if the respondent received positively framed information on others’ behaviour (group 
1), and 0 otherwise (control group or group 2). T2 is a second dummy variable that takes the 
value 1 if the respondent received negatively framed information (group 2), and 0 otherwise 
(control group or group 1). We run the following econometric specification in order to 
identify the effect of framing: 
 𝑃(𝑦 = 1) = 𝐹(𝛽1𝑇1 + 𝛽2𝑇2) (2) 
where F(.) is again the cumulative distribution function of the logistic distribution. 
Finally, so as to control for the effects of individual characteristics X on farmers’ decisions to 
maintain their newly adopted practices, we also introduce these characteristics as covariates in 
the regression: 
 𝑃(𝑦 = 1) = 𝐹(𝛼𝑇 + 𝑋′𝛾) (3) 
Vector X includes variables describing general farm characteristics: utilisable agricultural 
area (UAA) in hectares, the type of AES currently subscribed to, and type of farming 
activities. We assume that a higher UAA can increase the probability to maintain land sparing 
options and that the burden of continuing with better environmental practices without 
payment may differ across AES options and farming activities. Also included in vector X are 
variables aimed at signalling potential low additionality of farmer’s participation, i.e. whether 
the respondent states that he already (almost) complied with the scheme’s requirement before 
joining, and to what extent he had to change his farming practices to comply with these 
requirements (low changes, medium changes or major changes). Indeed, as discussed in 
section 2, alternative hypothesis can explain why farmers may continue to use their pro-
environmental land management practices at the end of the program. First, we hypothesize 
that minor changes are easier and less costly to maintain than more important ones. However, 
if important investments have been done to comply with the AES option, it might be more 
difficult to revert to old practices. Second, we introduce proxy variables to capture different 
types of motivations for continuing MAEt practices after the end of the contract (Glaeser 
2014): pecuniary, non-pecuniary selfish and non-pecuniary altruistic motivations. Farmers 
who could earn a higher gross margin, who could sell their products at a higher price and who 
faced no technical difficulties with the AES requirements might have pecuniary motives to 
maintain the adopted practices. Farmers who, during the AES, state that they experienced a 
better life quality (in terms of health, labour constraints etc.) and/or explain that they gained 
an acknowledgment that their farming activity contributed to the protection of the 
environment and to high quality land management might have non-pecuniary selfish motives 
to do so. Finally, farmers who state that protecting the environment through their participation 
in the AES is a source of satisfaction by itself are likely to have purely altruistic motivations.  
Sample 
525 farmers participating in the MAEt scheme answered the national online survey, from 
which 83 stated that their joining the MAEt scheme had not changed their practices and 442 
who, on the contrary, have adopted new practices. These 442 farmers were asked whether 
they intended to continue with these newly adopted practices when the payments ceased, and 
395 answered the question. Hence, the answer rate for the question concerning the 
permanence of changes is almost 90% with only 47 farmers choosing not to address this 
question
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. The sample used for analysis is therefore constituted of these 395 farmers randomly 
distributed among the 3 groups, with 128 respondents in the control group, 126 in group 1 and 
141 in group 2.  
As described in Table 2, the sample includes farmers engaged in AES options aiming at a 
reduction in fertilizers use (variable name AES fertilizers), at a reduction in phytosanitary 
products use (AES phytosanitary), at management of land cover, pastures and moors (AES 
land cover, introducing for example constraints on mowing periods to favour biodiversity 
conservation), at the creation or upkeep of grassland (AES grassland), at the management of 
specific structural landscape features, like hedgerows or ditches (AES linear) or finally AES 
options for conversion to organic farming (AES organic). Other minor options, concerning the 
management of specific environments (for example reed beds or salt marshes) or landscape 
are also represented in the sample, and have been grouped together under the “AES other” 
variable. Farmers included in the sample have adopted 1.8 options on their farm on average 
(standard deviation 1.02), 80% being engaged in 1 or 2 options. The most common farming 
activity in the sample is field crops (41.3% of the sampled farmers), followed by mixed 
farming (31.7%), and livestock farming (20.3%).  
There was a range of feedback from respondents on their experience with the MAEt scheme.  
20% of them declared that joining the AES enabled them to sell their agricultural products at 
a greater price and 42% increased their total gross margin. But, almost half of them stated that 
they had experienced difficulties in relation with the technical constraints imposed by the 
AES contract
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. On the other hand, a wide majority of respondents (89%) stated that their 
participation in the scheme provided them with greater social acknowledgement of their 
contribution to the protection of natural resources and to local land management, and they 
almost unanimously (96%) stated that their participation provided them with the individual 
satisfaction of participating in the protection of the environment
7
. Nearly fifty per cent have 
experienced an improvement in their quality of life due to their participation in AES. Some 
68% of the farmers of our sample acknowledged that they joined the AES partly because their 
practices were already in line with AES requirements. Nevertheless all of them stated that 
they have changed their land management practices after their enrolment in the AES. 46 % of 
the interviewed farmers stated that they had to implement “low levels” of change in their 
practices to conform to the AES requirements, 39% have implemented “medium” changes 
and only 15% have implemented “major” changes. Remember that the 83 respondents who 
chose the fourth option (no changes) are excluded from our sample. 
[Table 2] 
Some of this feedback varies depending on the type of option chosen by farmers. For 
example, farmers who had to reduce their phytosanitary products use state significantly more 
often they have implemented major changes and had technical difficulties than farmers not 
concerned with this type of option. Farmers under land cover options seem to perceive more 
acknowledgement for their environmental effort from society, which can be explained by the 
better visibility of these practices, for example the management of pastures to prevent forest 
fires. We also find, not surprisingly, that those who chose to engage into an AES for the 
reduction of pesticide use experience better life quality than farmers who did not adopt this 
option type. In the following we will thus control for the effect of these differences. 
Table 3 shows that, overall, random assignment between treatment groups has created 3 
groups with similar characteristics for most of the variables we control for. However, we 
observe a few differences that we have to account for during the analysis. Farmers who 
adopted options for structural landscape features management (AES linear) are over-
represented in the group who received information (T=1), and especially in the group who 
received positively framed information (T1=1), while those who adopted organic options are 
under-represented in the group with information. Farming activities as well as farmers under 
phytosanitary constraints (AES phytosanitary) are also unevenly distributed between the two 
framing groups (T1=1 and T2=1). Finally, fewer farmers have altruistic motivations in the 
group that received negatively framed information. 
[Table 3] 
V. RESULTS 
To the question “Would you continue your newly adopted practices after the contract ends” 
(see Table 1), farmers could choose one of the four responses: “absolutely”, “probably yes”, 
“probably no” or “not at all”. Figure 1 shows the percentage of answers in the three 
informational treatments. We also observe in Figure 1 an increase in the percentage of 
respondents stating “probably yes” or “absolutely” between control group (no information), 
group 2 (negatively framed information) and group 1 (positively framed information). The 
second part of this section will therefore focus on measuring the effect of the treatments, in 
particular in testing the significance of the difference observed in Figure1. In the following 
analysis, we pooled responses to work with a binary variable: y=1 if the answer is 
“absolutely” and “probably yes”, y=0 if the answer is “not at all” and “probably no”. 
[Figure 1] 
Permanence 
On average, 55% of farmers (219 of the 395 who answered this question) were willing to 
maintain the practices adopted during the AES after the end of the contract. This percentage 
remains high, 43%, when we consider the control group only, excluding the influence of the 
treatments. Table 4 presents the results of the logit models. Since the marginal effects of each 
variable cannot be directly observed from the coefficients of the logit models, we present the 
odds ratios. The odds ratio indicates the effect of an increase of one unit of the considered 
independent variable on the odds that farmers intend to continue the AES land management 
practices rather than abandon them. Therefore an odds ratio lower than 1 indicates a negative 
effect of the variable on the dependent variable. Logit 1 and logit 2 present the results on the 
effects of the information on the social norm and on the framing of this information. Results 
will be discussed in the next subsection. To analyse how farmers’ characteristics (X) impact 
their intention to continue the AES land management practices, we now consider the Logit 3 
model in Table 4. 
[Table 4] 
As expected, the likelihood of continued implementation of AE practices post-contract 
decreases if farmers have experienced technical difficulties during implementation. The odds 
of continuing the new practices are more than 50% lower in that case. Conversely, if the new 
AE practices have generated a better sale value for production, the odds of continuing these 
are more than doubled (but this effect is significant at only 10%).  
Farmers who experienced acknowledgment for their contribution to the protection of the 
environment or a better life quality are more likely to maintain the adopted practices even in 
the absence of payment, which indicates that they might have non-pecuniary selfish 
motivations to do so. Farmers who experienced acknowledgment may value external positive 
judgments and might fear social disapproval if they return to their less environmentally-
friendly practices. On the other hand, farmers who did not experience acknowledgment may 
feel fewer qualms to revert to their old practices.  
No significant effect of altruistic motivation was detected (captured by “Contribute to the 
environment”). Indeed, over 384 responses, 369 respondents (96 %) state that they enrolled in 
the AES to participate to the preservation of the environment. Altruism is one of the drivers of 
participation for almost all respondents. This lack of variation across farmers in our data 
prevents us from giving any conclusion about the effect of this motivation on farmers’ choice 
to maintain the adopted practices at the contract end (Table 2). Not surprisingly, farmers are 
more likely to continue AE practices if they implemented small rather than major changes to 
conform to the AES requirements or if they already conformed before joining the AES (Table 
4, Logit 3). This result confirms the intuition that a long term upkeep of the practices is linked 
to a low additionality of the scheme.  
Finally, and more surprisingly, farmers who participate in an AES phytosanitary option 
(aiming at a lower use of pesticides) display a greater propensity to maintain the adopted 
practices while options of grassland management or reduction of fertilizers use decreases it. 
This is rather counter-intuitive since the reduced use of pesticide may result in greater yield 
variability. However, it can be explained by the fact that farmers have to invest in greater 
knowledge of pest and weed management techniques in order to comply with the AES 
requirements. Once such investment has been made, it might be less profitable to revert to 
previously-used techniques.  
Effect of social norm and framing 
The results also show that being provided with the information that a majority of farmers 
would not revert to their old (detrimental) practices is sufficient to trigger a higher proportion 
of positive responses concerning future commitment to maintain AE practices. Indeed, α is 
positive and significant (Table 4, Logit 1) and the odds ratios show that the odds that farmers 
maintain the adopted practices is more than twice higher (2.1 in Logit 1) when information 
about the social norm (T=1) is given than without such information. This effect is even 
stronger, with an odds ratio of 2.8, when controlling for the observable characteristics of the 
respondents in Logit 3 (Table 4) which were slightly unbalanced between treatment groups 
(Table 3). This effect is also directly observed in the proportion of farmers who state that they 
would maintain the AES practices after the contract ends: 61% of farmers who received 
information, compared with only 43% in the control group (Table 3). The treatment variable T 
stays also highly significant when we run logit regressions by type of option (AES fertilizers, 
AES phytosanitary, AES land cover and AES grassland). 
However, a test of equality of parameters for variables T1 and T2 in logit 2 (Table 4) reveals 
that there is no significant difference between the two estimates of the parameters 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 
as defined in equation 2, which means that the way information is framed, positively or 
negatively, has no significant effect here. This is contradictory with the literature where an 
attribute framing effect is considered ‘‘a reliable phenomenon’’ (Levin et al. 2002, p. 413). 
Note that in our survey the information about the social norm is quite strong since the rate of 
farmers stating that they would maintain their practices at the end of the contract was 80% in 
our pilot survey.  This may lessen the impact of the negatively framed information (that only 
20% do not continue with the newly-adopted practices).  
In an attempt to identify if some of the characteristics included in X might influence 
positively or negatively the susceptibility of farmers to social norms, interaction variables T*X 
have been included in Logit 4. We can in particular expect farmers with non-pecuniary selfish 
motivations, in our case those who experienced social acknowledgement, or farmers with 
purely altruistic motivation to be influenced by the information that other farmers intend to 
maintain the adopted practices. Indeed if farmers state that social judgement on their 
contribution to the environment is important for them, they might equally be sensitive to their 
peers’ judgement and have a strong preference for conformity to social norms. Purely 
altruistic farmers might also be more likely to maintain the adopted practices if they know that 
others do so, as it increases the chances of their own actions having an impact on the 
environment. However, we could not detect any significant effect of these two interaction 
variables, “Acknowledgment*T” and “Contribute to the environment*T”, suggesting that 
farmers’ sensitivity to the social norm is not dictated by these motivations. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The first result of this paper is that the “end of the contract” problem in AES might not be as 
problematic as previously thought. Indeed, 43% of the surveyed farmers intend to maintain 
the practices they have adopted under the AES requirements, even in the absence of financial 
incentives or knowledge of others’ intentions. This result conforms to that obtained by 
Roberts and Lubowski (2007) and in the study by ECA (2011). We show that pecuniary and 
non-pecuniary selfish motivations, like social acknowledgement or a better life quality, can 
partly explain this intention. However, we also show that low levels of land management 
change are more likely to be permanent than major changes. Therefore, the long lasting 
transition towards more environmentally-friendly practices in agriculture can be expected to 
be slow and incremental. This means that the decision to renew contracts should be partly 
based on the environmental additionality of schemes: schemes which produce bigger changes 
in farm practices are more likely to suffer a reversion to pre-contract management than those 
which produce smaller changes. They are more susceptible to suffer from a relatively higher 
rate of loss of environmental capital once contracts expire.  
More interestingly, we find that farmers participating in the French MAEt scheme are 
conditional co-operators. Hence providing information on what others intend to do, as an 
indicator of a social norm, can be a powerful nudge to increase the permanence of pro-
environment practices. As such, this paper adds to a series of results which are increasingly 
inspiring public economists for more ambitious policies targeted at farmers (DEFRA 2008 ; 
World Bank 2015). Much attention has been granted to the design of incentive policies such 
as taxes or subsidies to reduce polluting activities from agricultural activities. The recent 
economic crisis in Europe, which makes green taxes more politically sensitive and reduces the 
margin of manoeuvers for public spending, has given momentum to a new kind of policies 
relying more on suasion and psychology than on monetary incentives.  
Of course, this can raise ethical issues, extensively discussed by Thaler and Sunstein (2008), 
since there is a risk for public authorities to “manipulate” citizens’ choices in a “paternalistic” 
manner which does not coincide with what their choices under free will would be. Whilst 
much of the social nudge literature is focused on changing behaviour towards a mode that is 
deemed better for the subject’s own well-being by those implementing the policy (e.g. 
encouraging children to eat more healthily), our use of the term involves a different context. 
We use information on a social norm to nudge farmers into continuing with pro-environment 
practices at the end of an agri-environment contract. Note that such behaviour is entirely 
voluntary for the farmer, as indeed was their uptake of the contract in the first place. We also 
assume that the continuation of pro-environmental benefits yields a social benefit in terms of 
enhanced water quality and human health. However, farmers are not being coerced into 
stating that they would continue with these practices: it is entirely free choice made by them, 
which they presumably arrive at by comparing the utility to themselves of alternative actions. 
Moreover, it can be underlined that this utility can include a pay-off from bringing one’s own 
behaviour closer to the social norm, as Czajkowski et al. (2015) show. 
One potential limit of this paper is that it relies on stated intentions rather than actual 
behaviour to study the social norms effect. For strategic reasons, farmers might over- or 
under-state their intention to maintain the adopted practices and more (or fewer) farmers than 
were found through the survey will actually maintain them. However, there is no reason to 
think that the treatment effects of giving information on others' intentions influence this 
strategic behaviour, nor that strategic behaviour will vary systematically across treatments. As 
the treatment is randomly assigned across participants, we can then expect that the impact we 
capture by comparing the relative levels of permanence between the treatment and control 
groups reflects its likely actual impact on farmers’ decisions to maintain pro-environment 
land management practices after AES contracts end.  
To conclude, this paper contributes to the literature showing that in general, people have 
preferences for following social rules and may suffer disutility when violating social norms. 
Farmers are no different: their individual behaviour is likely to be influenced by the behaviour 
of others.  This should be kept in mind when designing an agri-environmental scheme. As 
shown in this paper, informing a farmer on the choices made by her peers can induce her to 
conform. Communicating the average adoption rate of an agri-environmental contract – 
through articles in agriculture magazines or information via farmers’ organizations - could 
thus help to persuade more farmers to enrol, if this average adoption rate was high enough. 
Proposing contracts which include a specific reward for a collective success can help to signal 
the social norm to farmers. For example, Kuhfuss et al. (2015) show with a choice experiment 
survey that a monetary bonus paid to all contractors if the adoption rate is above a given target 
can improve farmers’ participation and increase land enrolment for lower overall budgetary 
costs. Indeed, this study shows that wine growers in the South of France does value this 
conditional bonus much more than its expected monetary value. In addition, they suggest that 
the introduction of this conditional bonus contributes to increased expectations of farmers on 
others’ participation, therefore shifting a pro-environmental social norm and favouring the 
adoption of less pesticide-intensive farming practices. In such case, combining a financial 
incentive with a behavioural nudge can increase the efficiency of public policy with no added 
costs.  
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Tables 
Table 1: Treatments 
 
Treatment  Framing of the question 
Number of 
respondents 
Control 
group 
T0: no 
information 
After your period of agreement ends, do you 
plan to maintain these changes without 
renewal of the contract? 
128 
Group 1 
T1: positively 
framed 
information 
In a previous survey, 80% of the 
respondents stated that they would 
maintain the new practices they had 
adopted, even without renewal of their 
contract. After your period of agreement 
ends, do you plan to maintain these changes 
without renewal of the contract? 
126 
Group 2 
T2: negatively 
framed 
information 
In a previous survey, 20% of the 
respondents stated they would not 
maintain the new practices they had 
adopted without renewal of their contract. 
After your period of agreement ends, do you 
plan to maintain these changes without 
renewal of the contract? 
141 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the sample 
Variables Obs. 
% of Obs. / 
Mean (Std. Dev.) 
Pecuniary motivations   
Increased gross margin 360 41.7% 
Higher value 343 20.1% 
Technical difficulties 384 48.2% 
Non-pecuniary selfish motivations   
Social acknowledgment 376 88.8% 
Better life quality 348 49.4% 
Non-pecuniary altruistic motivations   
Contribute to environment 384 96.1% 
Additionality   
Already conform 357 67.8% 
Low changes 395 46.1% 
Medium changes 395 38.5% 
Major changes 395 15.4% 
Farm characteristics   
UAA
1
 (ha) 382 153.30 (97.76) 
AES fertilizers 395 50.6% 
AES phytosanitary  395 44.8% 
AES land cover 395 30.9% 
AES grassland 395 23.0% 
AES linear 395 16.5% 
AES organic 395 4.1% 
AES other 395 12.2% 
Vine or arboriculture 385 4.2% 
Livestock farming 385 20.3% 
Field crops 385 41.3% 
Mixed farming  385 31.7% 
Other agricultural production 385 2.6% 
1: Utilisable Agricultural Area (UAA) – standard deviation into brackets 
 
 
Table 3: Balancing tests and mean value of the dependent variable in each treatment group 
Group  Control T=1 T1=1 T2=1 
 N=128 N= 267 N=126 N=141 
 Mean Mean p-value
1
 Mean p-value
2
 Mean p-value
3
 
Y 0.430 0.614*** 0.001 0.659*** 0.004 0.574 0.551 
Pecuniary motivations   
Increased gross margin 0.482 0.386* 0.085 0.412 0.909 0.364 0.120 
Higher value 0.171 0.216 0.338 0.252 0.103 0.182 0.509 
Technical difficulties 0.508 0.469 0.476 0.468 0.704 0.471 0.745 
Non-pecuniary selfish motivations   
Acknowledgment 0.911 0.877 0.339 0.849* 0.098 0.903 0.501 
Better life quality 0.487 0.498 0.846 0.536 0.287 0.463 0.395 
Non-pecuniary altruistic motivations   
Contribute to 
environment 
0.976 0.954 0.308 0.984 0.109 0.927** 0.011 
Additionality   
Already conform 0.713 0.661 0.327 0.655 0.524 0.667 0.738 
Medium changes 0.359 0.397 0.472 0.397 0.737 0.397 0.707 
Major changes 0.156 0.154 0.945 0.159 0.871 0.149 0.822 
Farm characteristics   
UAA (ha) 157.623 151.169 0.545 160.308 0.344 143.105 0.130 
AES fertilizers 0.531 0.494 0.493 0.500 0.863 0.489 0.615 
AES phytosanitary  0.430 0.457 0.610 0.381* 0.066 0.525** 0.022 
AES land cover 0.305 0.311 0.901 0.333 0.471 0.291 0.562 
AES grassland 0.219 0.236 0.704 0.214 0.603 0.255 0.380 
AES linear 0.086 0.202*** 0.004 0.278*** <0.001 0.135 0.234 
AES organic 0.078 0.022*** 0.009 0.024 0.249 0.021 0.149 
AES other 0.133 0.116 0.634 0.143 0.374 0.092 0.184 
Vine or arboriculture 0.032 0.046 0.501 0.049 0.610 0.044 0.870 
Livestock farming 0.230 0.189 0.348 0.238 0.243 0.146** 0.040 
Field crops 0.444 0.398 0.382 0.320** 0.011 0.467 0.109 
Mixed farming  0.262 0.344 0.106 0.377* 0.084 0.314 0.925 
Other agricultural 
production 
0.032 0.023 0.619 0.016 0.421 0.029 0.768 
Note 
1: reports the p-value of the test that the mean values for both groups T=1 and control are equal 
2: reports the p-value of the test that the mean values for both groups T1=1 and T1=0 are equal 
3: reports the p-value of the test that the mean values for both groups T2=1 and T2=0 are equal 
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
 
  
Table 4: Models results (odds ratios) 
 Odds ratios 
Y Logit 1 Logit 2 Logit 3 Logit 4 
T 2.113***  2.686*** 2.634*** 
T1 (ref: T0)  2.562***   
T2 (ref: T0)  1.792**   
Pecuniary motivations     
Increased gross margin   1.505 1.548 
Higher value   2.220* 2.222* 
Technical difficulties   0.457** 0.452** 
Non-pecuniary selfish motivations     
Acknowledgment (centered in Logit 4)   2.541* 2.313 
Better life quality   1.915* 1.908* 
Non-pecuniary altruistic motivations   
Contribute to environment (centered in Logit 4)   1.760 0.365 
Additionality     
Already conform   2.059** 2.089** 
Medium changes (ref: low changes)   0.636 0.652 
Major changes (ref: low changes)   0.368** 0.361** 
Farm characteristics     
UAA (ha)   0.998 0.998 
AES fertilizers   0.528** 0.539** 
AES phytosanitary   2.998*** 3.021*** 
AES land cover    1.760 1.758 
AES grassland   0.402** 0.409** 
AES linear   2.307* 2.134* 
AES organic   1.689 1.695 
AES other   2.167 1.956 
Vine or arboriculture (ref: other agric. prod.)   1.126 1.152 
Livestock farming (ref: other agric. prod.)   0.718 0.715 
Field crops (ref: other agric. prod.)   0.686 0.690 
Mixed farming (ref: other agric. prod.)   0.618 0.635 
Acknowledgment (centered) * T    1.094 
Contribute to environment (centered) * T    8.842 
_cons 0.753 0.753 0.624 0.609 
N 395 395 287 287 
Log likelihood -265.49 -264.49 -143.97 -143.36 
Pseudo R2 0.0219 0.0256 0.2729 0.2760 
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 ; S.E.: Standard Error 
Note: N is <395 in Logit 3 and 4 due to missing observations for X 
 
  
Figures 
 
Figure 1: Percentage of farmers intending to maintain the pro-environment practices after the contract end according 
to the three treatments. 
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 Footnotes 
                                                 
 
1
 Financial plan of the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EARDF) axis 2 measure 214 (agri-
environment). 
2
 The strategy method, in which a responder makes conditional decisions for each possible information set, is 
usually opposed to the more standard direct-response method. 
3
 Using the software Limesurvey®. 
4
 Based on the responses of 91 farmers participating to the MAEt scheme. 
5
 There are no significant differences in the answer rates of the 3 groups. 
6
 Some examples reported by farmers in an open-ended question of the survey include: difficulties to manage 
weeds without herbicides during rainy years difficulties in respecting the objective of input reduction each year 
of the 5-year commitment, timing issues for AES options which include constraints on the period of 
interventions (mowing date for example), that can be incompatible with weather conditions or workforce 
availability. Previous surveys with farmers participating in the MAEt scheme in France have shown that field 
slopes or narrow rows in vineyards and orchards can hinder mechanical interventions, which are usually 
substitutes to the use of phytosanitary products. All these “technical difficulties” which vary from one farmer to 
another according to his farming skills, equipment and local constraints, do have an impact on his decision to 
maintain pro-environment practices without contract payments. 
7
 In open ended questions of our survey, many farmers highlight their concern for the environment (altruistic 
motivations). They are often upset that their efforts for preserving landscape, biodiversity and the environment in 
general is not sufficiently acknowledged by policy- makers and society in general. Therefore, many respondents 
claim that they enrolled in AES to demonstrate and make more visible their environmental contributions (and to 
gain greater social acknowledgment of their efforts).  
